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China is working to increase its creation of indigenous 
technological inventions and become a more technology-based 
economy.2 New technologies create new products, new markets, new 
processes for doing business, and even new industries, while improving 
an economy’s overall efficiency and competitiveness. While China’s 
economy has grown at an average annual rate of close to 10% over the 
last three decades3—one of the highest periods of sustained economic 
growth in history—that growth has not been fueled by indigenous 
inventions. China’s ability to accumulate the technology needed to 
support its economic growth has primarily come through technology 
importation.4 Instead of relying on indigenous technology creation, 
 
 2 See e.g., NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (NDRC), 
THE OUTLINE OF THE ELEVENTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, at Chaps. 1 and 7 (2006), available in 
English at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/hot/t20060529_71334.htm [hereinafter Outline of Eleventh Five-
Year Plan]; THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE NATIONAL 
MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM PROGRAM FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (2006–
2020) (2006), available in English at 
http://www.cstec.org/uploads/files/National%20Outline%20for%20Medium%20and%20Long%2
0Term%20S&T%20Development.doc [hereinafter Science and Technology Development Plan]; 
THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY (June 5, 2008), available in English at 
http://english.gov.cn/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm [hereinafter The National IP Strategy]; 
STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE (SIPO), NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
(2011–2020) (Nov. 11, 2010), available in English at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf [hereinafter 
The Patent Strategy]. 
 3 Arthur R. Kroeber, Why Financial Reform is Critical for China’s Growth, BROOKINGS 
(2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/03/19-china-financial-
reform-kroeber. 
 4 JOHN L. ORCUTT & HONG SHEN, SHAPING CHINA’S INNOVATION FUTURE: UNIVERSITY 
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various government policies have sought to entice foreign businesses to 
transfer their technology to China.5 China’s leadership has concluded 
that its technology importation strategy has “run its course”6 and that 
Chinese inventors need to play a greater role in the country’s economic 
future.7 
Encouraging Chinese inventors to obtain more patents plays a 
major role in China’s policies to increase indigenous inventions.8 
China’s National Patent Development Strategy (2011–2020)9 (the 
Patent Strategy), for example, establishes specific, quantitative targets 
for Chinese inventors to achieve by 2015. By that time, the Patent 
Strategy calls for China to rank in the top two patenting countries as 
measured by the number of invention-type patents10 granted to domestic 
inventors.11 The Patent Strategy also calls for Chinese inventors to 
double overseas patent applications from 2010 to 2015.12 It should come 
as little surprise that China’s indigenous innovation policy encourages 
Chinese inventors to obtain more patents as patents offer a powerful 
market-based tool to incentivize the creation, development, and use of 
technological inventions.13 By providing enforceable and transferable 
property rights in an invention, patents help to motivate each step in the 
inventive process—from the earliest stages of research and development 
to the commercialization of the invention. 
What is somewhat unique about China’s indigenous innovation 
 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN TRANSITION 174–75 (2010). 
 5 Id.; see also Cong Cao, Richard P. Suttmeier & Denis Fred Simon, China’s 15-Year 
Science and Technology Plan, PHYSICS TODAY, Dec. 2006, at 38, 39, available at 
www.levin.suny.edu/pdf/Physics%20Today-2006.pdf. 
 6 Cao, Suttmeier & Simon, supra note 5. 
 7 See e.g., Outline of Eleventh Five-Year Plan, supra note 2; Science and Technology 
Development Plan, supra note 2; The National IP Strategy, supra note 2; The Patent Strategy, 
supra note 2. 
 8 See infra Part I, Table 1. 
 9 The Patent Strategy, supra note 2. 
 10 China’s patent system provides for three types of patents: invention patents; utility patents; 
and design patents. China’s Patent Law, Art. 2). China’s Patent Law is available in English at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20100211022732_large.pdf. Invention patents tend to 
be the most valuable and technologically sophisticated of the three categories of patents; they are 
roughly the equivalent to the United States’ utility patents, receive twenty years of protection 
from the date of filing, and receive a thorough substantive examination. See China’s Patent Law, 
Art. 39, 42. Utility model and design patents in contrast only receive ten years of protection from 
the date of filing and are only subject to a preliminary examination. See China’s Patent Law, Art. 
40, 42. Invention patents are typically more valuable than utility model and design patents, which 
are sometimes derisively referred to as “petty” patents or “junk” patents. RICHARD P. SUTTMEIER 
& XIANGKUI YAO, CHINA’S IP TRANSITION: RETHINKING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
A RISING CHINA, NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, NBR SPECIAL REPORT NO. 29, at 14 
(July 2011). 
 11 The Patent Strategy, supra note 2, at 4 (Part III). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See WILLIAM J. MURPHY, JOHN L. ORCUTT & PAUL C. REMUS, PATENT VALUATION: 
IMPROVING DECISION MAKING THROUGH ANALYSIS 23 (2012). 
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policy, however, is its use of subsidies to encourage patent applications 
and its recognition that such subsidy programs need to be carefully 
designed in order to generate higher-quality patents.14 China has used a 
number of crude tools, including patent fee subsidy programs, to 
encourage patent applications for quite some time.15 The results of these 
efforts have been mixed. On the one hand, patent applications by, and 
patent issuances to, Chinese inventors have soared.16 As of 2010, there 
were more than 1.8 million domestic patents in force in China.17 On the 
other hand, the quality of a significant portion of these patents is 
questionable.18 China’s patent policies, including its patent fee subsidy 
programs, have encouraged inventors to obtain many patents, but not 
necessarily many valuable patents. 
The Chinese government has grown concerned that its patent fee 
subsidy programs have not funded the most deserving patents, and thus 
they no longer wish to spend public resources to promote low-value 
patents. Instead, the government would prefer subsidy programs that 
encourage the most deserving patents. The Patent Strategy reflects this 
desire, as the fourth strategic focus of the Patent Strategy recognizes the 
need to “[o]ptimize [China’s] patent subsidy policy and further define 
the orientation to enhance patent quality.”19 This Article explains how a 
disciplined and transparent valuation-based decision making process 
 
 14 The Patent Strategy, supra note 2, at 8 (Part IV.4). 
 15 See e.g., Willy Shih et al., Office of Technology Transfer—Shanghai Institutes for 
Biological Sciences, Harvard Business School Case Study No. 9-611-057, 3–4 (2011): 
Many . . . factors also drove up the number of patents in China, most notably, improper 
uses of patent applications as required by the policies or rules of various governmental 
agencies or academic institutions. For example, governmental funding agencies usually 
required one or more patents to be filed at the end of a research grant period, which 
caused many grant recipients to have to find something to file without even 
considering the commercial value. In some universities or institutions, graduate 
students can graduate only if they either publish a scientific paper or file a patent, 
which caused some students to file junk patents in order to graduate. Other improper 
uses included giving advantages to people who had patent applications when 
evaluating for job promotions. 
 16 In 2010, Chinese inventors filed 293,066 invention-type patent applications and received 
79,767 invention-type patent grants. 2011 CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK ON SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY, NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS, MINISTRY OF SCI. & TECH. 180–81 (2011). In 
1995, by comparison, Chinese inventors filed only 10,018 invention-type patent applications and 
received only 1,530 invention-type patent grants. Id. 
 17 Id. at 182. 
 18 See e.g., Mark Liang, Chinese Patent Quality: Running the Numbers and Possible 
Remedies, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 478, 482, 491–514 (2012); Henry Koda, The 
Global Patent Race, 24 NO. 1 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 21, 22 (2012) (referencing quality 
concerns expressed by others); Mark Cohen (speaking on a moderated panel), China’s Current 
Intellectual Property Plan, Policies & Practices, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 17, 28 (2011); 
Joff Wild, Telling It How It Is, 48 INTELL. ASSET MGMT. 67, 72–73 (2011); Innovation in China: 
Patents, Yes; Ideas, Maybe, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2010, at 78, 78–79. 
 19 The Patent Strategy, supra note 2, at 8 (Part IV.4). 
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can help the Chinese government design patent fee subsidy programs 
that allocate funds more consistently to deserving patents. In addition, 
this Article offers the outline of a practical valuation model the Chinese 
government could use to filter patent fee subsidy requests. 
I.     CHINA’S INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICY AND ITS CALL TO 
IMPROVE THE GOVERNMENT’S PATENT SUBSIDY POLICY 
China’s current indigenous innovation policy can be traced back to 
its 2006 National Science and Technology Plan (the 2006 Science and 
Technology Plan). The Science and Technology Plan is embodied in 
China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010)20 and the accompanying 
National Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology 
Development Plan (2006–2020).21 The 2006 Science and Technology 
Plan makes clear that technological progress is to be the driving force 
behind China’s future economic growth and calls for China to become 
an “innovative nation” by 2020.22 To advance the intellectual property 
initiatives from the 2006 Science and Technology Plan, China’s State 
Council23 issued the National Intellectual Property Strategy (the 
National IP Strategy) in 2008.24 And to implement the patent elements 
of the National IP Strategy, China’s State Intellectual Property Office25 
(SIPO) issued the Patent Strategy in 2010.26 
Collectively, these three documents guide indigenous innovation 
policy in China, which calls for China to reduce its dependence on 
 
 20 For an English-language summary of China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan, see Outline of 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan, supra note 2. Five-year economic plans were long the driving force for 
China’s economy. When China became a planned economy in the early 1950s, it took to using 
five-year plans to allocate China’s economic resources and efforts. GREGORY C. CHOW, CHINA’S 
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 44 (2d ed. 2007). As China began to embrace a market-oriented 
economic approach, five-year plans changed from being a strict resource allocation tool to 
providing a method for announcing national priorities and key national projects. See What is the 
Five-Year Plan?, CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL (Apr. 5, 2006), 
http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-04/05/content_245556.htm. 
 21 Science and Technology Development Plan, supra note 2. 
 22 Outline of Eleventh Five-Year Plan, supra note 2, Chap. 7. 
 23 The State Council is China’s chief executive and administrative body. 
The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, namely the Central People’s 
Government, is the highest executive organ of State power, as well as the highest organ 
of State administration. The State Council is composed of a premier, vice-premiers, 
State councillors, ministers in charge of ministries and commissions, the auditor-
general and the secretary-general. 
The State Council, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (ENGLISH),  
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/data/organs/statecouncil.shtm (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). 
 24 The National IP Strategy, supra note 2. 
 25 SIPO is China’s version of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
 26 The Patent Strategy, supra note 2. 
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foreign technology and increase domestic production of the 
technological inventions that are needed to drive China’s economic 
growth.27 One of the major goals in each of the 2006 Science and 
Technology Plan, the National IP Strategy, and the Patent Strategy is for 
Chinese inventors to obtain more patents. 
Table 1 
Patent Targets for Chinese Inventors in China’s 2006 Science and 
Technology Plan, National IP Strategy, and Patent Strategy 







will rank in the top 
five countries in 
receipt of invention-
type patents by 
2020.28 
China will rank 
among the advanced 
countries in terms of 
annual number of 





Chinese inventors will 
greatly increase.30 
China will rank in the 
top two patenting 
countries as measured 
by the number of 
invention-type patents 
granted to domestic 




Chinese inventors will 
double by 2015.32 
 
China’s government has implemented a number of policies and 
initiatives to help achieve these targets. Many of these actions have 
focused on improving China’s patent infrastructure, which should 
indirectly increase the number of domestic patents by lowering the 
administrative costs for obtaining patents. The Patent Strategy calls for 
the government to make a number of patent infrastructure 
improvements, including: enhancing SIPO’s capacity to examine 
patents, which includes increasing the number of patent examiners and 
developing more efficient examination procedures;33 making patent 
information more accessible by establishing “a multi-level and multi-
 
 27 See Outline of Eleventh Five-Year Plan, supra note 2, Chap. 7; Science and Technology 
Development Plan, supra note 2, at 12 (Part II.2), 46–53 (Part VII), 54 (Part VIII.3); The National 
IP Strategy, supra note 2, at 1 (Parts I(4), II.2(6)), 2 (Parts II.2(7)), III.2(11)–(12)), 4 (Part 
V.1(40)); The Patent Strategy, supra note 2, at 8 (Part IV.4). 
 28 Science and Technology Development Plan, supra note 2, at 12 (Part II.2). 
 29 The National IP Strategy, supra note 2, at 2 (Part II.2(7)). 
 30 Id. 
 31 The Patent Strategy, supra note 2, at 4 (Part III). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 9 (Part IV.5). 
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aspect information public service system for patents;”34 improving 
administrative and judicial patent protection, with the goal of lowering 
the cost of enforcing patent rights;35 accelerating development of a 
patent service industry that involves “information retrieval, analysis, 
early warning, data processing, database building, patent consultation, 
transaction, trust, assets appraisal and pledge loans;”36 strengthening 
patent management functions in government-controlled entities;37 and 
making patents an integral part of China’s economic development 
policy.38 
In addition to these indirect efforts to boost domestic patenting 
activities, the Patent Strategy also calls for a number of direct efforts. 
The Patent Strategy, for example, calls for the Chinese government to 
conduct a study to determine appropriate inventor rewards in 
government-funded research projects39 and to provide preferential 
policies, including tax incentives, to encourage businesses to produce 
patents.40 
One of the Patent Strategy’s most direct efforts to increase 
domestic patent activity is the use of patent fee subsidies to encourage 
patent filings. For more than ten years now, various levels of the 
Chinese government have implemented patent fee subsidy programs to 
cover costs associated with obtaining patents. In 1999, the Shanghai 
municipal government implemented “Subsidization Measures of Patent 
Fees in Shanghai.”41 Shanghai is not alone in this approach; numerous 
local governments have employed similar programs.42 The early patent 
subsidy programs appear to have focused primarily on subsidizing the 
costs for filing patents in China.43 More recent patent fee subsidy 
programs focus on subsidizing foreign patent application fees. For 
example, SIPO operates a special fund44 to subsidize foreign patent 
applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (the SIPO Patent 
 
 34 Id. at 11 (Part IV.8). 
 35 Id. at 9–10 (Part IV.6). 
 36 Id. at 11–12 (Part IV.9). The industry development may involve privatizing government 
patent information service agencies. Id. 
 37 Id. at 7 (Part IV.3). 
 38 Id. at 6–7 (Part IV.2). 
 39 Id. at 8 (Part IV.4). 
 40 Id. at 7 (Part IV.2). 
 41 Wen Jiachun, Zhou Yongtao & Zhu Xuezhong, Research on Patent Fees Subsided by 
Local Government in China, 2008 INT’L CONF. ON INFO. MGMT, INNOVATION MGMT & INDUS. 
ENG’G 270 (2008). 
 42 See id. 
 43 See id. 
 44 Chinese Ministry of Finance Memo, Notice of the Ministry of Finance on Issuing the 
Interim Measures for the Administration of Special Funds for Subsidizing Foreign Patent 
Applications (Aug. 28, 2009), English version available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7806 [hereinafter The Memo]. 
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Subsidy Program).45 The SIPO Patent Subsidy Program is restricted to 
Chinese small- and medium-sized companies, public institutions 
(including universities), and government research institutions.46 
Successful applicants may receive funding to cover application fees, 
examination, maintenance, and issuance fees, as well as patent agent or 
attorney fees, search fees, and other related expenses incurred by the 
patent agent or attorney.47 The SIPO Patent Subsidy Program subsidizes 
these fees for up to five countries (or regions) at a level of up to Rmb 
100,000 (roughly US$ 15,000) per country (or region).48 
Evidently, the Chinese government has developed concerns that its 
various subsidy programs are not subsidizing the right patents.49 While 
not retreating from the use of patent fee subsidies, the fourth strategic 
focus of the Patent Strategy states the need to “[o]ptimize [China’s] 
patent subsidy policy and further define the orientation to enhance 
patent quality.”50 The Chinese government is looking to deploy its 
subsidy resources more efficiently to promote patent quality, rather than 
just patent quantity. 
II.     SUBSIDY PROGRAMS BENEFIT FROM VALUATION-BASED       
DECISION MAKING 
Market failure is the typical justification for governments to 
intervene in private market transactions.51 A market failure occurs when 
some barrier or inefficiency in the market causes significant allocation 
efficiencies.52 In the case of developing technological inventions and 
obtaining patents, there are a number of well-documented market 
failures. Two of the more commonly cited causes for market failures in 
the inventive process (invention to market) are the free-rider problem 
and the uncertainty problem. 
The free-rider problem arises because the inventive process does 
 
 45 “The Patent Cooperation Treaty makes it possible to seek patent protection for an invention 
simultaneously in each of a large number of countries by filing an ‘international’ patent 
application. Such an application may be filed by anyone who is a national or resident of a PCT 
contracting State. It may generally be filed with the national patent office of the contracting State 
of which the applicant is a national or resident or, at the applicant’s option, with the International 
Bureau of WIPO in Geneva.” Summary of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) (1970), WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/pct/summary_pct.html (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2013). 
 46 The Memo, supra note 44, Article 3. 
 47 Id. at Article 6. 
 48 Id. at Article 5. 
 49 The Patent Strategy, supra note 2, at 8 (Part IV.4). 
 50 Id. 
 51 THOMAS J. WEBSTER, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 687 (2003). 
 52 See CHRISTINE GREENHALGH & MARK ROGERS, INNOVATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 17 (2010). 
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not generate an easily protectable good or service. Instead, it generates 
knowledge, which suffers from a problem that economists refer to as 
“free-riding.”53 It is inherently difficult to prevent others from copying 
knowledge without paying the knowledge producer.54 “Knowledge 
spillover” is another way to describe this problem. Private sector 
research and development generates both “private returns”—returns for 
which the knowledge producer is compensated—and “social returns”—
returns for which the knowledge producer is not capable of being 
compensated. Numerous studies have shown that the social returns from 
private-firm research and development investment can be substantial.55 
Because firms cannot capture the full value of their inventive efforts, 
the private sector is likely to underinvest in research and development.56 
And patents appear to provide only a partial solution to this free-
rider/knowledge spillover problem.  
The uncertainty problem is inherent to the inventive process.57 
Inventions involve new technologies that may not work as planned or 
may not scale to useful levels. They also lack a historical track record of 
proven economic returns. This uncertainty makes judging new 
technologies’ future performance particularly difficult. The increased 
difficulty in projecting the future performance of inventions prevents 
informed decisions as to whether (and how much) to invest in such 
projects. 
Such problems can create a considerable gap in the innovation 
system that, if unaddressed, prevents the creation and 
commercialization of an optimal level of technological inventions. 
Economic theory suggests that well-designed and implemented 
government subsidies can reduce the impact of these market failures by 
counterbalancing the private sector’s underinvestment in research and 
development.58 But government subsidies present their own set of 
problems. If the government is not capable of identifying which 
 
 53 MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS, supra note 13, at 104–05. 
 54 Knowledge can be described as being “nonrival” (i.e., it can be used by an infinite number 
of people at the same time without depriving any person of its use) and only “partially 
excludable” (i.e., it is difficult to exclude unintended parties from benefiting from ideas). Paul 
Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. OF POL. ECON. S71, S74 (1990). 
 55 Kenan Patrick Jarboe & Robert D. Atkinson, The Case for Technology in the Knowledge 
Economy—R&D, Economic Growth, and the Role of Government, PROGRESSIVE POLICY 
INSTITUTE POLICY BRIEFING 5 (June 1998); see also JOSEPH CORTRIGHT, U.S. ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, NEW GROWTH THEORY, TECHNOLOGY AND LEARNING: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, REVIEWS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LITERATURE AND PRACTICE, 
NO. 4, at 7 (2001), available at www.rosecommunitydevelopment.org/New_Growth_Theory.pdf. 
Because the original knowledge producer is not compensated for these social returns, they are 
unlikely to serve as incentives for private research and development decisions. 
 56 See GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 52, at 17–18. 
 57 Id. at 21. 
 58 See generally id. at 24–25. 
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research and development projects should be subsidized and which 
should not, valuable public resources will be wasted and the competitive 
market for conducting research and development could be damaged.59 
For purposes of this Article, we are not taking a position on 
whether China’s patent subsidy programs will provide a net benefit to 
China and its overall innovation system or whether they will cause a net 
detriment. Instead, we are taking as a given that the Chinese 
government will operate one or more patent subsidy programs. The 
focus of this Article and its proposed solution is how to improve the 
efficiency of such patent subsidy programs so that even if they turn out 
to cause a net detriment to China’s overall innovation system, that 
detriment is minimized. If the patent subsidy programs turn out to be 
beneficial, such benefits can be maximized under the solution proposed 
in this Article. 
When the government decides to subsidize a private market 
transaction, concerns justifiably arise that the government’s actions will 
lead to wasteful resource deployment. This concern stems from 
skepticism about the government’s competence (is the government 
decision maker capable of consistently making good decisions?) and 
motivations (will the government decision maker be corrupt?). In the 
context of Chinese patent fee subsidy programs, the main question is: 
will the Chinese government consistently be able to subsidize 
applications for the most deserving patents, or will it regularly ignore 
the most deserving patents and instead subsidize weak patents that do 
not warrant patent application funding? Fortunately, there are a number 
of relatively simple valuation techniques that can be employed that 
would greatly facilitate the Chinese government’s allocation decisions 
regarding patent fee subsidies. Employing these relatively simple 
valuation techniques can improve the likelihood such subsidy programs 
improve China’s indigenous production of valuable commercial 
technology. 
III.     VALUATION-BASED DECISION MAKING 
Every decision involves a value determination. When one 
alternative is chosen over another, the decision maker has, either 
consciously or subconsciously, valued the chosen decision higher than 
the competing choices.60 If a company decides to acquire Asset A rather 
than Asset B, the firm has determined the net benefits that will come 
from owning Asset A are greater than if the company acquired Asset B. 
 
 59 Some of the risks to the competitive market for conducting research and development 
include crony capitalism or collusive capitalism. 
 60 MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS, supra note 13, at 43. 
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If the government decides to fund Program A and not Program B, the 
government has decided the net benefits from Program A are greater 
than for Program B. 
 
Figure 1 
Choosing Between Government Programs Based on  
Net Economic Benefit 
Decisions can be significantly improved by recognizing they can 
be quantified, compared, and evaluated.61 The decision maker can 
determine the value of the decision in terms of a quantifiable, common 
measurement—usually money—and then make an apples-to-apples 
comparison to alternatives based on the common measurement.62 Take 
the example of the above government funding decision between 
Programs A and B. Assume the primary purpose of the programs is to 
create jobs for purposes of general economic development. If the 
decision maker can project (a) the economic benefit that will come from 
each program’s job creation and (b) the cost of funding and running 
each program, then she can then choose the program that will generate 
the greatest net economic benefit (see Figure 1). For those decision 
makers who purposefully or inadvertently try to avoid valuation 
analyses, their avoidance efforts will not be successful.63 Every decision 
involves choosing one option over another, which, by definition, means 
the decision maker valued the option chosen as better than the other 
option along some dimension (e.g., creates more jobs or generates more 
profits). Whether or not the values used or implied in making the 
decision are logically derived, consistent or sufficiently encompassing is 
another matter and one that can be addressed by proactively 
approaching the decision making process with a disciplined valuation 
methodology. 
Up to this point, few would disagree with the basic premise that 
 
 61 Id. at ix. 
 62 Id. at 43. 
 63 Id. at 4. 
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valuation analysis improves decision making. We seldom meet 
resistance with the theoretical benefits that valuation can generate. 
Where we meet resistance, however, is from those who are skeptical 
about valuation’s practical application. That line of critique questions 
how valuation can practically be implemented into basic decision 
making. In fact, there are two primary reasons valuation analysis may 
appear too onerous for general use in broader decision making: (1) 
belief that valuation analysis (in particular for patents) is too 
complicated and expensive to perform and requires valuation experts to 
do it properly; and (2) concern that valuation analyses are likely to be 
inexact and flawed.64 
The first concern is simply wrong. While expert guidance and 
assistance can be beneficial, most valuation techniques (even those for 
patents) are within the understanding of anyone with a willingness to 
learn and an open mind.65 The second concern is a bit more subtle. 
Valuation is not a one-size-fits-all endeavor.66 There is no single 
approach to valuing decision alternatives. Moreover, there is no single 
approach for how much to invest in a particular valuation effort or what 
level of accuracy is required for the effort to be worthwhile. For some 
decisions, the valuation effort needs to be quite extensive and extremely 
accurate to be useful. For other decisions, a less extensive and less 
accurate effort could still be beneficial to the decision maker. 
Sometimes just the benefits generated by the disciplined thought 
process that valuation requires can justify a valuation effort. 
A.     Using a Relative Value Technique to Guide Chinese Patent Fee 
Subsidy Programs67 
In the case of a patent fee subsidy program, each funding decision 
tries to determine whether to invest public funds to bring about a given 
patent. In 2010, 293,066 domestic applications for invention-type 
patents were filed with SIPO.68 Even if only 0.1% of those patents were 
eligible for a subsidy program, 3,000 patents would still need to be 
evaluated. For that size decision, a less extensive and less accurate, but 
still logical and disciplined, valuation approach is all that is realistic. 
 
 64 Id. at 53. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 54. 
 67 The relative value technique proposed in this paper is an example of an analytic hierarchy 
valuation process and is based on a valuation technique proposed in MURPHY, ORCUTT & 
REMUS, supra note 13, at 58–65. The relative value technique proposed in this article is a specific 
application of the more general technique described in that book. 
 68 2011 CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 16, at 
180. 
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Fortunately, there are facile and inexpensive valuation techniques that 
could be used to provide the Chinese government with better 
information for determining which patents to subsidize (see Figure 2). 
While we do not have enough information about China’s various patent 
fee subsidy programs to craft a truly detailed valuation model for the 
specific programs, we do have enough information to outline a general 
technique that provides an idea of how disciplined valuation analysis 
could be employed to improve subsidy decisions. 
Figure 2 
Using Valuation as an Allocation Filter 
The recommended technique is a two-stage, three-dimensional 
valuation exercise that we refer to as a “relative value” technique (see 
Figure 3). This technique is not meant to establish definitive values for 
the various patents seeking a subsidy, which would be very expensive 
and cumbersome. Instead, the technique seeks to do two things. First, it 
identifies and organizes the available information that will affect the 
future value of the patents along three separate dimensions: (1) the 
economic importance to China of the patent; (2) the legal strength of the 
patent; and (3) the disruptive technology potential the patent offers. 
Second, the technique combines the information in a manner that allows 
government decision makers to make informed projections about each 
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Figure 3 
Diagram of the Relative Value Technique 
 
At the most basic level, the value of a patent depends on an 
analysis of both its legal and economic elements. Legal factors that 
affect the value of a patent may include the breadth of the claims,69 the 
presence (or absence) of blocking patents,70 whether the patent covers 
the critical competitive elements of the invention, whether there is any 
close prior art,71 how courts are currently interpreting patents of this 
type,72 and the receptivity of foreign jurisdictions to the patent. On the 
 
 69 The legal definition of the invention is set forth in the claims. The claims are, in effect, 
similar to a deed for real estate in that they set the legal boundaries of the invention. Claims 
drafting has a major effect on the value of patent rights. If the claims are too narrow, substantial 
value will be left on the table as other parties may be able to easily invent around the patent. If too 
broad, however, the claim may be invalidated in a subsequent proceeding. 
 70 A blocking patent is a patent that blocks a rights holder on a different patent from 
exploiting the different patented invention without a license to the blocking patent. 
 71 In order to be eligible for a patent, an invention must be “new” or “novel.” In the United 
States, for example, this novelty requirement is contained Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act. 35 
U.S.C. § 101. The term “prior art” refers to the materials (or references) that define the universe 
of available knowledge that is “pertinent to the novelty inquiry.” ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN 
R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 74 (2004). 
 72 For example, the value of a “software” patent may depend on how courts are interpreting 
the rules surrounding the patentability of software. China’s Patent Law, for example, excludes 
rules and methods for mental activities from patent protection. China’s Patent Law, Art. 25(2). 
China’s Guidelines for Patent Examination 2010 (the Guidelines) explain that rules and methods 
for mental activities are not patentable because they do not involve any technical characteristics. 
The Guidelines, Chap. 1, § 4.2, available in English at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zlsqzn/sczn2010eng.pdf. The Guidelines go on to provide a long list of 
activities that are considered to be rules and methods for mental activities, including “computer 
programs per se.” Id. The term “computer programs per se” is generally considered to capture 
software, but the ability to obtain “software patents” can be a bit more subtle due to the definition 
of “computer programs per se” in the Guidelines and how it is differentiated from “computer 
program-related inventions.” ORCUTT & SHEN, supra note 4, at 118. 
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economic side, the subsidy’s justification should derive from the social 
returns the given patent is expected to provide China and its taxpayers. 
Factors that are likely to generate such social returns may include the 
size of the future potential market, the strategic importance of the 
technology sector to China and its economy, job-creation potential, 
whether the technology compliments other Chinese technology sectors, 
whether the technology reduces environmental degradation, and the 
proven track record of the inventor. 
A third dimension that we recommend for the relative valuation 
analysis is what we refer to as “disruptive technology potential.” 
Clayton Christenson used the term “disruptive technology” in a seminal 
1997 book73 to describe unanticipated technologies that displace 
established technologies and competitors.74 Classic examples of 
disruptive technologies include the semiconductor replacing vacuum 
tubes in the computer industry, digital image and storage chips 
replacing film and tape in the photography and recording industries, and 
desktop computers replacing mainframe computers as the primary 
source of computing power for most businesses. Christenson’s thesis for 
the success of disruptive technologies can be reduced to five basic 
points:75 (1) At first, disruptive technologies tend to underperform 
established technologies along the performance dimensions historically 
valued by mainstream customers.76 (2) Disruptive technologies, 
however, offer other features that a few fringe (and generally new) 
customers desire.77 Disruptive technology offerings tend to be “cheaper, 
simpler, smaller, and, frequently, more convenient to use.”78 (3) The 
leading firms’ most profitable customers are not interested, and 
 
 73 Christenson’s “disruptive technology” work began with an article he co-wrote with Joseph 
Bower. See Joseph L. Bower and Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the 
Wave, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 43. Christenson built on that work with a best-selling 
book, which remains the seminal piece on disruptive technology. See CLAYTON M. 
CHRISTENSON, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS 
TO FAIL (1997). 
 74 CHRISTENSON, supra note 73, at xiv–xviii. Christensen’s thesis of disruptive technology is 
very Schumpeterian in nature. Economist Joseph Schumpeter developed a related concept more 
than a half century ago the he referred to as “creative destruction.” JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950). A healthy economy is a dynamic 
organism that is constantly in a state of change and renewal. Id. Innovation (the creative part) and 
competition constantly revolutionize the company from within—“incessantly destroying the old 
one, incessantly creating a new one.” Id. By seeking innovations to render their competitors 
obsolete, innovators create new products, markets, processes for doing business, and even new 
industries, while inefficient companies, products, and business methods are destroyed. 
Established competitors, as well as entire industries, are forced out of business if they cannot 
meet the increased competition, which causes a constant renewal of the economy. 
 75 This breakdown of Christensen’s thesis was motivated by Gerald J. Tellis, Disruptive 
Technology or Visionary Leadership?, 23 J. PROD. INNOV. MANAG. 34, 34 (2006). 
 76 CHRISTENSEN, supra note 73, at xv. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
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probably cannot even use, the disruptive technology when first 
introduced.79 As a result, disruptive technology offerings are first 
commercialized in emerging or insignificant markets and embraced by a 
market’s least desirable customers.80 (4) While disruptive technologies 
initially offer worse product performance, the technology improves until 
it becomes performance-competitive in the mainstream market.81 (5) 
Once the disruptive technology becomes performance-competitive, it 
displaces the dominant technology because it more accurately targets 
customers needs, including offering a better price.82 
While disruptive technology potential is related to the economic 
benefit factor, it is sufficiently different that we recommend treating it 
as a separate factor. The economic benefit factor measures a 
technology’s ability to succeed in the current market setting based on its 
ability to interact with established technologies and business practices. 
The disruptive technology potential seeks to measure the ability of a 
technology eventually to displace established technologies and business 
practices and create entirely new markets and practices. Because 
disruptive technologies tend to underperform established technologies 
in satisfying customers’ current demands, they risk generating a low 
economic importance score and are easy to overlook when deciding 
which patents to subsidize. As we will explain below, however, 
disruptive technologies may be the patents that are most suitable for 
government subsidies.83 
B.     Mechanics of the Relative Value Technique 
Complex decisions with multiple dimensions of analysis are 
difficult to assess without a structure to guard against 
oversimplification.84 Determining which patent subsidy candidates will 
be most valuable to China depends on a considerable number of diverse 
but interrelated factors. Without a proper valuation structure, collecting, 
analyzing, and interpreting the relevant information is beyond the 
capabilities of most humans. To compound matters, few, if any, 
government decision makers have the combined legal, economic, and 
technical expertise that is required to truly understand a patent subsidy 
candidate’s potential to benefit China. Finally, the scope of the task 
limits the amount of resources the government can spend on valuing any 
 
 79 Id. at xvii. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at xvi. 
 82 Id. at xvi, xxii. 
 83 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 84 See generally MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS, supra note 13, at 67–87. 
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one patent subsidy candidate. 
One method to improve decision making in this type of 
challenging environment is to disassemble the problem into its 
individual parts, apply focused logic and analytical rigor to each part, 
and then reassemble the individual parts back into a coherent solution 
that can be evaluated at the aggregate level.85 This disassembly process 
helps the decision maker to identify the individual factors that 
collectively generate the overall value of the item being valued, 
generate a better understanding of those individual factors and how they 
interact to generate value, organize the information so that it can be 
dealt with in a manageable way, and identify and eliminate extraneous 
information that is not important to the valuation process.86 Disassembly 
also allows multiple evaluators with different areas of expertise to all 
contribute to the decision-making process.87 Legal experts can provide 
information about the legal qualities of the patent without having to 
worry about a lack of economic or technology expertise. Economists (or 
business experts) can provide focused information about the patent’s 
economic qualities and technology experts can provide focused 
information about the quality of the technology. The reassembly process 
brings these disparate judgments back together so that an informed 
decision can be made based on the collective knowledge and expertise 
of the various evaluators. 
The relative value technique that we propose provides an 
inexpensive but powerful disassembly method that: (a) collects the 
combined legal, economic, and technical information needed to make an 
informed patent subsidy decision; (b) analyzes that information in a 
clear, consistent, and transparent manner; and (c) logically assembles 
that information into a final result that can be readily understood using 
the visual power of a cluster map.88 We propose conducting the relative 
value technique in two stages: 
Stage one consists of a preliminary analysis of patent subsidy 
candidates based on their legal and economic factors. Stage 
one provides an initial filtering of the candidates to identify 
which candidates clearly merit a subsidy, which candidates 
clearly do not merit a subsidy, and which candidates require 
further analysis. 
Stage two applies a second filter to those patent subsidy 
 
 85 Id. at 69. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. at 85–86. 
 88 Reduced to its core, valuation analysis has three elements: (1) collecting information 
inputs; (2) employing valuation techniques that translate the information input into value results; 
and (3) interpreting the value results. Id. at 67. The relative value technique that we are proposing 
performs each of these three functions. 
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candidates that require further analysis. Stage two, which is 
when the disruptive technology potential analysis is 
introduced, seeks to identify highly speculative candidates that 
have so much upside potential they warrant a subsidy. 
1.     Stage One—Analyzing Economic Importance and Legal Strength 
Stage one of the relative value technique reduces a patent subsidy 
candidate’s various economic and legal dimensions to x and y 
coordinates that can be plotted on a two-axis chart (see Figure 4) that 
we refer to as a “patent cluster map.” The relative value technique 
allows the valuator (or valuators)89 to place each patent subsidy 
candidate on the chart and then use the visual power of the patent 
cluster map to easily compare the various candidates across their 
economic and legal dimensions. 
 
Figure 4 
Stage One—Plotted Relative Value of a Single Patent Subsidy 




 89 We recommend having different groups evaluate the different dimensions. Legal experts 
should evaluate the patent subsidy candidates’ legal qualities, economic experts should evaluate 
their economic quality, and technology experts should evaluate their technology quality. Since the 
various assessments are later combined for a holistic analysis, using lawyers, economists, and 
technology experts in the initial valuation provides an excellent method for obtaining their 
differing areas of expertise. 
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a.     Determine the Economic Importance of the Patent to China 
In order to determine the economic importance of the patent 
subsidy candidate to China, we suggest preparing a uniform “economic 
importance score sheet” (see Table 2). This uniform score sheet seeks to 
identify and quantify the various economic factors that are likely to 
provide social returns to China. The factors listed in Table 2 are simply 
illustrative. A much more detailed analysis would be required to 
determine the ideal factors. To obtain more information from the 
exercise, we recommend weighting the importance of the factors rather 
than treating all factors as equal. The combined weights of all factors 
must add up to 1 (or 100 percent). Each factor is scored from 0-to-5 and 
then multiplied by that factor’s weight to yield a factor value. All the 
factor values are added up to yield a single economic importance value 
for the patent subsidy candidate, which will be the x value on the 
relative value chart. The uniform score sheet will be used for each 
patent subsidy candidate uniformly (hence the name “uniform” score 




Example of a Completed Economic Importance Score Sheet 
Economic Factor that Generate 







Size of the future potential market 0.1 x 4 = 0.4 
Strategic importance of the 
technology sector 0.2 x 3 = 0.6 
Job creation 0.3 x 4 = 1.2 
Compliments other Chinese 
technology sectors 0.1 x 4 = 0.4 
Reduces environmental degradation 0.1 x 2 = 0.2 
Proven track record of the inventor 0.2 x 4 = 0.8 
Total of weights must add up to 1.0 1.0     
 
 




b. Determine the Legal Strength of the Patent 
The legal strength of each patent subsidy candidate must also be 
evaluated. The process is similar to that used to assess economic 
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importance. We suggest preparing a uniform “legal strength score 
sheet” (see Table 3). The legal strength score sheet should include the 
legal factors that affect the ability of a patent holder to profit from the 
patent, with the factors listed in Table 3 being simply illustrative. As 
with the economic factor score sheet, the legal strength factors should 
be weighted, with the combined weights adding up to 1 (or 100 
percent). Each factor is scored from 0-to-5 and then multiplied by that 
factor’s weight to yield a factor value. All the factor values are added up 
to yield a single legal strength value for the patent subsidy candidate, 
which will be the y value on the relative value chart. 
 
Table 3 
Example of a Completed Legal Strength Score Sheet 





Broad claims 0.2  3  0.6 
No blocking patents 0.2  2  0.4 
Patent covers critical competitive elements 0.3  3  0.9 
No close prior art 0.1  1  0.1 
Impact of relevant court decisions 0.1  4  0.4 
Foreign jurisdictions’ receptivity to the patent 0.1  4  0.4 
Total of weights must add up to 1.0 1.0     
 
 




c. Making the Various Determinations 
The question is frequently asked: what is the best way to choose 
the various factors and weights when creating the uniform score sheets? 
There is no single approach for making those choices. In fact, the 
process of discussing and determining the factors and weights is, in and 
of itself, a highly useful endeavor for the decision maker. We 
recommend against simply delegating this task to outside experts, 
although their assistance may be helpful. These discussions lead to a 
deeper understanding and appreciation of the relevant factors and how 
they interact to generate the social returns that drive the purpose for the 
subsidies in the first place. 
A related, and equally relevant, question is: who should evaluate 
and score the patent subsidy candidates? We do not know enough about 
the strengths and capabilities of the various Chinese government 
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agencies that provide patent fee subsidies to make a concrete 
suggestion. But we caution against assigning the task to evaluators with 
a singular perspective. Unfortunately, many patent evaluators approach 
patent valuation from either a legal perspective or an economic 
perspective. If the evaluator is a patent attorney, there is a significant 
risk any patent valuation will overemphasize the legal aspects of the 
patent valuation and underemphasize the economic aspects. If the 
valuator has an economic background, the valuation is likely to suffer 
from the opposite bias. One benefit of the relative value technique is the 
ease with which it can collect and combine the wisdom from legal, 
economic, and technology experts and thereby allow each to contribute 
to the valuation exercise. Ideally, the economic importance score sheets 
will be scored by economic and technology experts and the legal 
strength score sheet will be scored by patent lawyers. 
d.     Using a Patent Cluster Map to Provide an Initial Subsidy 
Determination 
Once a collection of patent subsidy candidates is plotted on the 
patent cluster map, the results can be analyzed. Figure 5 provides an 
example of a plotted stage one patent cluster map. The government 
decision maker could employ the results in a number of ways. Our 
recommendation is to use the patent cluster map as an initial filter that 
identifies which candidates clearly merit a subsidy, which candidates 
clearly do not merit a subsidy, and which candidates require further 
analysis. This approach allows the government decision makers to strike 
a balance in how much to invest in the subsidy determination process. 
Obvious “yes” and “no” determinations can be made without the need 
to commit any further resources. For those candidates that do not fall 
within an obvious “yes” or “no” category, additional resources can be 
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Figure 5 
Example of a Plotted Stage One Patent Cluster Map 
 
We suggest dividing the patent cluster map into three areas to 
cover the automatic inclusion zone, the automatic exclusion zone, and 
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Figure 6 
Example of a Plotted Stage One Patent Cluster Map that Is  
Divided into Automatic Inclusion, Automatic Exclusion,  
and Further Analysis Zones 
 
1. Automatic Inclusion Zone. Figure 6 shows a congregation 
of patent subsidy candidates in the upper right-hand section of 
the map that are both economically and legally strong. If the 
goal of the patent subsidy program is to fund high-quality 
patents, these candidates should be funded so long as there are 
sufficient funds in the patent subsidy program. These 
candidates represent high-quality inventions that are 
economically important to China and can be protected with 
strong patents. The “Automatic Inclusion Zone” set forth in 
Figure 6 is simply illustrative. Where to draw the line for 
automatic inclusion will depend on a number of factors, not 
least of which is the amount of money that is dedicated to the 
subsidy program. 
2. Automatic Exclusion Zone. Figure 6 also shows a 
congregation of patent subsidy candidates in the bottom 
sections of the map that are legally weak. Valuable inventions 
do not always translate into valuable patents. If, for example, 
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there is close prior art that may result in a future invalidation 
proceeding, or if the patent’s claims are so narrow that 
competitors can easily invent around the patent, then a 
valuable invention may not generate a valuable patent. Because 
the goal of the patent subsidy program is presumably to 
encourage valuable “patented” technology, these candidates 
that are legally weak should be automatically excluded without 
further analysis. As was the case for the Automatic Inclusion 
Zone, the “Automatic Exclusion Zone” set forth in Figure 6 is 
simply illustrative. 
3. Further Analysis Zone. A number of patent subsidy 
candidates do not fall within either the Automatic Inclusion 
Zone or the Automatic Exclusion Zone. For these candidates 
that fall within the “Further Analysis Zone,” a second stage 
filter is required. It is in stage two that we recommend 
considering the candidate’s disruptive technology potential. 
The patent cluster map’s graphical representation of the multifactor 
analysis allows the ultimate government decision makers to analyze 
hundreds, if not thousands, of patent subsidy candidates simultaneously. 
On a single sheet of paper (or a single computer screen), government 
decision makers can pull together the expert opinions of multiple 
evaluators and see how a huge number of patents compare to each other 
on a relative basis. This simultaneous analysis should make it easier for 
the decision makers to delineate the borders of the Automatic Inclusion 
Zone and the Automatic Exclusion Zone. 
The graphical representation also makes it easy to spot trends that 
may be correctable if recognized. For example, Figure 7 shows a patent 
cluster map with a substantial clustering of patent subsidy candidates in 
the lower right quadrant. That means a lot of economically valuable 
technology is being protected by very weak patents. That kind of 
problem can be corrected if appreciated and clearly communicated to 
the relevant inventor and legal communities. In the alternative, these 
economically strong, but legally weak, patent subsidy candidates may 
be good targets for other support policies because of their economic 
importance to China. Being able to inexpensively identify this potential 
should itself be very valuable to Chinese policymakers. 
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Figure 7 
Patent Cluster Map Allows Government Decisions Makers  
to Spot Trends 
2.     Stage Two—Incorporating Disruptive Technology Potential into 
the Analysis 
For patent subsidy candidates that fall in the Further Analysis 
Zone, we recommend conducting a second filtering stage that identifies 
and measures one or more characteristics the Chinese government 
wishes to promote. For example, the stage two filtering process could 
focus more specifically on the potential job impact or environmental 
impact of the candidate’s technology. While there is any number of 
potential stage two filters, we believe that measuring the disruptive 
technology potential of the patent subsidy candidates is an ideal 
characteristic on which to focus the stage two filtering process. Patents 
for disruptive technologies may be those that are most suitable for 
government subsidies. 
To begin with, the private markets are likely to underfund research 
and development for disruptive technologies. Because the leading firms’ 
most profitable customers are generally not interested, and probably 
cannot even use, most disruptive technologies when first introduced,90 
 
 90 Id. at xvii. 
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established firms are unlikely to fund disruptive technology research 
and development efforts. As Christensen notes, “[t]he highest-
performing companies . . . have well-developed systems for killing 
ideas that their customers don’t want. As a result, these companies find 
it very difficult to invest adequate resources in disruptive 
technologies.”91 Moreover, disruptive technologies also pose funding 
problems for professional private investors (e.g., venture capital firms) 
because disruptive technologies suffer from extreme uncertainty 
problems.92 It is “impossible to predict with any useful degree of 
precision how disruptive products will be used or how large their 
markets will be.”93 Not surprisingly, this heightened uncertainty 
negatively impacts the willingness of investors to invest.94 
Market failure is the typical justification for governments to 
intervene in private market transactions,95 and there certainly appears to 
be a market failure in the case of research and development funding for 
disruptive technologies. When coupled with the high upside potential 
that disruptive technologies offer to a country, the case for trying to 
reduce this underfunding problem is particularly strong. By creating 
entirely new markets and new ways of doing business that render the 
economy more competitive and more efficient, disruptive technologies 
can be among the most attractive technologies to a country. Therefore, a 
method to include the most promising of this group for patent subsidy 
could allow China to sow the seeds, however speculative, for future 
considerable rewards. 
In effect, we are suggesting that China take a “portfolio theory”96 
type of approach to its patent subsidy program and diversify its portfolio 
of subsidized patents with a group of high-risk, but potentially high-
return patents. Modern portfolio theory has instructed generations of 
financial asset managers that they can maximize returns by diversifying 
investments.97 China could use a similar lens for constructing its 
portfolio of patent subsidies. The country is making investments on 
 
 91 Id. at xix. 
 92 Id. at 158. 
 93 Id. 
 94 PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 157–58 (2d ed. 2004). 
 95 WEBSTER, supra note 51, at 687. 
 96 Modern portfolio theory is generally traced back to Harry Markowitz’s 1952 paper. See 
Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952). 
 97 In 1990, the Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to Markowitz, Merton Miller (also 
famous for his contribution to the Black-Scholes option pricing model), and William Sharpe (who 
is most noted for his work on the Capital Asset Pricing Model, or CAPM). The major insight of 
modern portfolio theory is that measurement of the risk of an entire portfolio, and not just the risk 
of individual investments, is key to managing the return of the investments in the portfolio. 
Markowitz and those who followed have shown that by informed balancing of the various classes 
of investments, one can construct a diversified portfolio with a certain risk that can achieve a 
higher average return than the associated risks and returns of individual investments it contains. 
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various assets with an expectation of generating social returns that 
exceed the investment. As with financial assets, diversifying the patent 
subsidy portfolio to include some higher-risk/higher-reward patents and 
some lower-risk patents (e.g., they have more predictable benefit 
expectations) should generate superior results. Those candidates that fall 
within the Automatic Inclusion Zone after stage one (see Figure 6) 
should tend to be lower-risk patents, while those candidates that qualify 
after the stage two disruptive technology analysis should tend to be 
higher-risk/higher-reward patents. 
To assess the disruptive technology potential of the patent subsidy 
candidates that fall in the Further Analysis Zone, we suggest using a 
second patent cluster map. For this second patent cluster map, the x 
value on the relative value chart will represent a patent subsidy 
candidate’s disruptive technology potential while the y value will 
represent the candidate’s legal strength score. 
To calculate a patent subsidy candidate’s disruptive technology 
potential, we suggest preparing a uniform “disruptive technology score 
sheet” (see Table 4). The disruptive technology score sheet should 
include the factors that are significant to measuring disruptive 
technology potential, with the factors listed in Table 4 being simply 
illustrative. As with the economic factor and legal strength score sheets, 
the disruptive technology factors should be weighted, with the 
combined weights adding up to 1 (or 100 percent). Each factor is scored 
from 0-to-5 and then multiplied by that factor’s weight to yield a factor 
value. All the factor values are added up to yield a single disruptive 
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Table 4 
Example of a Completed Disruptive Technology Score Sheet 








Transformative product or service 0.3  3  0.9 
Ability to create a new market 0.2  4  0.8 
Technology is cheaper, simpler, 
smaller, and/or more convenient to use 0.2  3  0.6 
Potential to address initially a smaller 
niche market that is currently ignored 
by leading firms 
0.2  4  0.8 
Potential to motivate the creation of a 
significant number of startups 0.1  2  0.2 
Total of weights must add up to 1.0 1.0     
 
Add all calculated factor values and then determine  




A candidate’s disruptive technology score should be interpreted in 
connection with its legal strength. Because this is a “patent” subsidy 
program, the legal strength of the potential patent remains highly 
relevant for the stage-two analysis. China is not just investing in 
technology, China is investing in “patented” technology that will 
provide its people with the additional benefits that are associated with 
patents.98 Since the legal strength of the candidate was already 
measured during stage one, the information can easily be incorporated 
into this second stage analysis. The candidate’s legal strength score 
from stage one is brought forward to become its y value for the stage 
two patent cluster map. 
The stage two candidates can then be plotted on the patent cluster 
map and the results analyzed. Figure 8 provides an example of a stage 
two plotted patent cluster map. Once again, the government decision 
maker could employ the results in a number of ways. One possibility is 
to use the stage two patent cluster map as a final filter to identify which 
candidates merit a subsidy. Figure 8 shows a possible cutoff for 




 98 For a thorough discussion of the various direct and indirect economic benefits that come 
patent rights, see MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS, supra note 13, at 103–17. 
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Figure 8  
Example of a Plotted Stage Two Patent Cluster Map 
 
C.     Additional Benefits of the Suggested Valuation Process 
One of the benefits of our proposed valuation process is the ease 
with which it can be updated or modified. Because each of the evaluated 
factors and final scores is represented as a numerical projection, the 
government decision makers can go back later and measure the 
accuracy of past scoring and weighting decisions and the importance of 
the various factors. China could then improve its subsidy performance 
over time by reevaluating the accuracy of its past decisions on a regular 
basis. 
Another benefit of our proposed valuation process is the verifiable 
decision-making record that it leaves behind. If the decision making 
results are regularly published, the transparent results can provide useful 
knowledge to inventors and their lawyers who will have an incentive to 
develop patented technology that is more likely to be subsidized. Since 
these should be precisely those patents that the Chinese government has 
strategically decided are more promising, the program should evolve 
into less of a filter to eliminate less desirable patents and more of an 
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information system to provide clear incentives to inventors to submit 
more promising patent subsidy candidates, thus eliminating the waste of 
producing worthless patents. 
Finally, government subsidy programs invariably raise concerns 
that the government agency will make funding decisions based on 
politics, favoritism, or corruption, rather than merit. A transparent 
verifiable decision-making record should also help to reduce those 
concerns. Moreover, dispersing the evaluation process among various 
experts makes it more difficult for candidates or government officials to 
use strategic behavior to skew funding decisions towards undeserving 
patent subsidy candidates. 
CONCLUSION 
The Chinese government has stated the need to “[o]ptimize 
[China’s] patent subsidy policy and further define the orientation to 
enhance patent quality.”99 This Article offers the outline of a practical 
valuation model the Chinese government could use to do just that. The 
two-stage, three-dimensional relative value technique proposed in this 
Article would allow the Chinese government, without the need for a 
significant resource commitment, to filter patent fee subsidy requests 
and allocate public funds to the most deserving patents. 
Whether operating a patent fee subsidy program is an effective use 
of public funds for promoting innovation remains an open question,100 
and is not something this Article tries to address. We are not taking a 
position on whether China should operate a patent subsidy program. But 
if China is going to operate such a program, our proposed valuation 
model will allow China to do so more efficiently and effectively. When 
the government decides to subsidize a private market transaction, 
concerns justifiably arise that the government’s actions will lead to 
wasteful resource deployment. In the context of Chinese patent fee 
subsidy programs, the question is: will the Chinese government 
consistently be able to subsidize applications for the most deserving 
patents, or will it regularly ignore such patents and instead subsidize 
patents that do not warrant patent application funding? The valuation 
model we propose in this Article should reduce such concerns. More 
specifically, the model should significantly improve the Chinese 
 
 99 The Patent Strategy, supra note 2, at 8 (Part IV.4). 
 100 David Kappos, while Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director 
of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, called on the academic community to explore 
that specific question. David J. Kappos, A Public Discussion on Strategies for Engaging China, 
Fordham IP Conference—Understanding China’s New Environment for Intellectual Property 
(Apr. 11, 2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2012/kappos_fordham.jsp. 
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government’s allocation decisions regarding patent fee subsidies and 
thereby improve the likelihood that such subsidy programs improve 
China’s indigenous production of valuable commercial technology. The 
relative value technique that we propose provides an inexpensive but 
powerful method that: (a) collects the combined legal, economic, and 
technical information needed to make an informed patent subsidy 
decision; (b) analyzes that information in a clear, consistent, and 
transparent manner; and (c) logically assembles that information into a 
final result that can be readily understood using the visual power of a 
cluster map. Moreover, the technique does not require expert valuators 
to implement. Instead, the technique seeks to improve the Chinese 
government’s decision making by offering a very practical solution for 
taking advantage of the disparate legal, economic, and technological 
expertise the government already possesses. 
Finally, while this Article’s proposed valuation model was 
motivated by China’s patent fee subsidy program, it is not limited to 
that program. Numerous countries, including Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Philippines, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom have launched similar patent fee subsidy programs.101 
This Article’s proposed valuation model would be applicable to any of 
these other patent fee subsidy programs. In addition, it could be used for 
filtering and awarding research and development funding grants and 
other types of government technology funding decisions. 
 
 101 Federico Munari & Liang Xu, Are Patent Subsidies for SMEs Effective? Empirical 
Evidence from Italy (Sept. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.epip.eu/conferences/epip06/papers/Parallel%20Session%20Papers/MUNARI%20Fed
erico.pdf; Managing Patents Costs: An Overview, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/managing_patent_costs.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2013). 
